Its our.in | India's Pride
There is growing discussion around whether the .IN domain extension is weaker than others and whether tightening its policies would meaningfully reduce phishing and cyber fraud. This narrative is emotionally appealing but technically flawed. The truth is uncomfortable yet clear. Phishing does not target extensions. It targets people.
This article explains why focusing narrowly on .IN reforms will not stop phishing attacks and why India must adopt a broader evidence based approach to digital security.
The Core Misunderstanding About Domain Abuse
A common assumption is that malicious actors prefer certain country extensions because they are easier to register. While registration openness can influence abuse patterns at the margin, it is not the deciding factor.
Attackers choose what converts.
If .IN registrations become harder tomorrow attackers will not stop. They will move to .COM .XYZ .TOP .ONLINE .SITE or any other available extension. This behavior is already well documented across global phishing campaigns.
The domain string is simply a disposable tool.
Phishing Works Above the Domain Layer
Real world phishing succeeds due to factors that have little to do with extension policy.
- Social engineering via email SMS WhatsApp and voice
- Brand impersonation using lookalike content not lookalike TLDs
- Compromised hosting and hacked websites
- Free TLS certificates and rapid DNS changes
- Slow takedown coordination across jurisdictions
An attacker can spin up hundreds of domains across multiple extensions in minutes. Blocking one door does not secure the building.
If Openness Equals Weakness Then .COM Should Be the First to Fall
Consider this simple logic test.
.COM is the most open and most widely registered extension in the world. It is also the most abused purely due to volume. Yet no serious security expert argues that .COM should require residency KYC or national restrictions.
Why ??
Because the internet works on global interoperability governed by bodies like ICANN not on national gatekeeping of strings.
Applying a different standard to .IN creates friction without improving outcomes.
The Real Risk of Overcorrecting .IN Policy
Over regulation of .IN carries real economic costs.
- Indian startups face higher onboarding friction
- MSMEs struggle with delays and compliance burdens
- Global founders hesitate to adopt .IN for India focused brands
- Investors read policy friction as ecosystem risk
Meanwhile attackers adapt instantly and move elsewhere.
The cost is borne by legitimate users not criminals.
What Actually Improves Digital Safety
If the goal is to reduce phishing and fraud the solutions are well known and globally accepted.
- Faster abuse response and takedown SLAs
- Strong registrar accountability and audits
- Cross border intelligence sharing
- Cooperation with browsers email providers and hosting firms
- Better DNSSEC adoption and monitoring
- Education and brand monitoring support for businesses
None of these require making .IN restrictive or inward looking.
.IN Is Not the Problem
.IN has grown because India has grown.
It represents confidence in the Indian digital economy. It is trusted by startups enterprises and consumers because it signals relevance and intent. Weakening its openness risks weakening its adoption without delivering security benefits.
Security comes from enforcement coordination and speed not from nationality checks on a string.
Conclusion
Phishing is a global problem executed at scale across all extensions. Making .IN stricter in isolation will not stop cybercrime. It will only shift abuse elsewhere while slowing legitimate growth at home.
India does not need symbolic fixes. It needs practical globally aligned solutions.
Strengthen enforcement. Improve coordination. Educate users.
Do not blame the extension.
